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Can infrastructure improvements mitigate unsafe traffic safety culture: a 
driving simulator study exploring cross cultural differences 
 
Abstract 
This paper presents the results of a cross-cultural study to investigate the influence of traffic safety 
culture and infrastructure improvements on driver behaviour. To achieve this, the driving style of UK 
drivers was compared with that of Nigerians with and without experience of driving in the UK. A 
driving simulator experiment compared the actual driving style of these three groups of drivers in 
different safety critical scenarios. The simulated road environment varied depending on how much 
infrastructure was provided (low or high infrastructure). In addition, the Driver Behaviour 
Questionnaire was used to collect self-reported data on violations, errors and lapses. It was 
hypothesised that Nigerian drivers with no experience of driving in a UK road system would report 
and engage in more unsafe driving behaviour compared to the other two groups, and that increasing 
infrastructure would have little positive benefit. Overall, the results supported these hypotheses, 
indicating that the behaviours of drivers are interpretable in relation to their traffic safety culture, 
compared to changes in their driving environment.   
Keywords: driver behaviour, driving simulator, Nigeria, traffic safety culture, road environment, 
infrastructure improvement     
1 Introduction 
National differences in traffic safety exist, with High Income Countries (HICs) outperforming the Low 
and Middle Income Countries (LMICs). Countries such as Norway, Sweden and the UK have 
decreased their road traffic fatality rates in the past decades, but they continue to rise in most 
LMICs. In its Global Status Report on Road Safety (2018), the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
reports that the highest road traffic fatality rates are in the African and South-East Asian regions. 
Although Africa is the least motorised (2%) region of the world, it accounts for 16% of all recorded 
crash deaths. Nigeria and South Africa have the highest fatality rates (33.7 and 31.9 deaths per 
100,000 population, respectively) being above the African average of 24 deaths per 100,000 
population (WHO, 2013). Reducing road traffic injuries has a positive effect on national income 
growth (World Bank, 2017) and thus for LMICs, in particular, efforts to understand and improve 
traffic safety are imperative. 
1.1 Traffic safety culture 
Factor et al. (2007), in their “social accident” model, stated that drivers belonging to different social 
groups interpret a given situation differently and this varied interpretation could result in crashes. In 
most LMICs, there is a paucity of formal traffic rules, resulting in drivers developing ways of 
communicating and interacting with each other informally (e.g. Gregory, 1985; Edensor, 2004). This 
has given rise to the term “traffic culture”. 
The term “culture” is common in the social sciences and humanities. Hoebel (1966) described 
culture as an integrated system of learned behaviour patterns. According to Bealer et al. (1965), 
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culture is the belief structure, shared ideas and directives for action that are embodied by a 
community. North (1990) citing the work of Boyd & Richerson (1985) defined culture as 
“transmission from one generation to the next, through teaching and imitation of knowledge, 
values, and other factors that influence behaviour.” Given that it strongly affects the way people live 
and behave, culture could influence the way people behave in traffic. Warner et al. (2009) suggest 
that an explanation for diversity in violations and crash involvement could be due to cultural 
differences. Thus the road safety values associated with a society or country would be expected to 
have a significant influence on driving behaviour. Leviäkangas (1998) described traffic culture as the 
sum of all factors (skills, attitude and behaviour of drivers as well as vehicles and infrastructure) 
which either directly or indirectly influence a country’s level of traffic safety. According to Iversen & 
Rundmo (2004), societal norms and pressure contribute to shaping attitudes towards rule-breaking 
and risk-taking behaviour.  
A country’s traffic safety culture is defined by its social norms, values and beliefs formed and 
nurtured by formal and informal rules. Formal rules which are mostly enforced by authorities may 
change overnight, but informal rules are developed as a result of constant interaction with other 
road users and the road environment. According to Özkan (2006), these informal rules are usually 
embodied in the customs and traditions of the road users and are not easy to change. He redefined 
traffic culture of a country as “the sum of all external factors (eco‐cultural‐socio‐political, national, 
group, organisational, and individual factors) and practices (e.g. education, enforcement, 
engineering, emergency services) for the goals of mobility and safety to cope with internal factors 
(road users, roads, and vehicles) of traffic”.  
According to WHO (2018), road fatalities rates in LMICs are more than double that in the HICs. 
Drivers in LMICs have been reported to exhibit more risky behaviour than drivers from HICs (Lund & 
Rundmo, 2009; Bener et al., 2008). The World Bank (2012) states that it is possible that cultural 
factors are more relevant in LMICs in accounting for high rates of traffic fatalities due to scant 
regulations which are not enforced due to limited resources and a lack of training for the police to 
manage traffic regulations. The high incidence of road traffic crashes in these countries can also be 
attributed to aberrant behaviour on the part of road users, unsafe vehicles, substandard road design 
and maintenance, little or no driver education and lack of enforcement of traffic safety laws (Peden 
et al., 2004). Atchley et al. (2014) confirmed these national differences from a comparison of traffic 
safety culture between China, Japan and the United States. Although they do not explicitly discuss 
driving styles, they conclude that the different crash risk records of the three countries are related to 
different cultural values attached to risk perception and obedience to traffic rules and regulations.  
Self-report studies by Nordfjærn et al. (2011; 2014) examined country cluster differences based on 
different cultural frameworks in road traffic risk perception, attitude towards road safety and driver 
behaviour in samples from Norway, Russia, India, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, Turkey and Iran. The 
results showed that Norwegians reported overall stronger traffic safety attitudes and behaviour 
(drink driving, seatbelt use, speeding) but drivers from Africa (Ghana and Uganda) reported the 
highest risk perception. They further claim that contrary to the cultural theory, prediction models 
revealed that cultural factors were stronger predictors of driver behaviour than risk perception.  
Özkan et al. (2006) used the Driver Behaviour Questionnaire (DBQ) to collect self-reported data from 
drivers across six countries (Finland, Great Britain, Greece, Iran, The Netherlands and Turkey). Two 
hundred and forty-two drivers were chosen from each of the six countries, matched for age and 
gender. The results revealed differences between drivers from “safe” Western/Northern European 
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and Southern European/Middle Eastern countries on DBQ items and scales. The authors conclude 
that driving style mediates the relationship between traffic culture (i.e. country) and the number of 
crashes. Their analyses also demonstrated the importance of driver characteristics and behaviours in 
predicting the number of traffic crashes and this varies from country to country. Thus, measures that 
succeed in a particular culture might not succeed in other cultures, considering the differences in 
traffic safety culture. 
1.2 The road environment  
Apart from traffic culture, driving behaviour and safety is also influenced by the road environment 
(Dixit et al., 2012; Hao et al., 2016), comprising of the vehicle, road infrastructure and traffic 
regulations. In this paper, the environment specifically refers to the external conditions to the 
vehicle (the road infrastructure).  
The road environment, including its traffic layout and safety features have a critical impact on road 
user safety (Jamroz, 2011). According to ROSPA (2010), environmental factors, including the road 
environment are the prime cause in 2-3% of crashes and contribute to about 18% of road crashes in 
total. However, altering and redesigning the road environment for example, by improving 
infrastructure can play an important role in road safety (Pérez, 2006). Good road infrastructure 
improves traffic safety by contributing to forming behaviours which can be performed automatically. 
Improvements in the road infrastructure (such as road signs, traffic lights and road markings) can 
reduce crashes, by reducing opportunities for road users to make errors; and if errors do occur, 
making the environment more forgiving (Almqvist & Hyden, 1994). High quality road infrastructure 
improves traffic safety by automatically triggering safe behaviours (Theeuwes & Godthelp, 1995; 
Martens, 2007). According to Elvik & Vaa (2004), the application, for instance, of traffic control 
signals at four arm junctions may lead to a 30% reduction in personal injury accidents. 
The road infrastructure conveys a wealth of information that guides drivers’ activity and their 
interactions with other road users. For example, a speed limit sign instructs drivers that they must 
drive no faster than the limit shown. However drivers’ perception of safe speed often differ 
depending on the road environment as some will often underestimate the actual level of risk. Some 
drivers may not know the speed limits on certain roads if they are not posted. This may encourage 
higher speeds, thereby increasing the likelihood of collisions and their severity. This can be further 
exacerbated by insufficient, poorly maintained or misleading road markings and signs, poor road 
surfaces and street furniture (Stanton et al., 2009). Unfortunately and especially in LMICs, roads are 
currently being built and reconstructed without any consideration for safety (Uzondu, 2018). These 
may lead to driving behaviours that are not appropriate, could mislead drivers and directly trigger 
crashes. It is crucial, therefore, that the road environment provides appropriate information to those 
using it as this may be one of the ways to improve behaviour and reduce crash rate.  
Infrastructure improvements have become a priority in road safety programmes and strategies 
(WHO, 2011) and are mostly derived from experience in HICs. However, if drivers in LMICs have 
come to rely on and react to cultural cues, rather than infrastructural ones, perhaps investment in 




1.3 The current study  
In this study, Nigeria and the UK were used as sample countries due to the distinct differences in 
terms of traffic safety performance. Nigeria has one of the worst traffic safety performances in the 
world while the UK is one of the countries with the best, as evidenced by their traffic fatality rate 
(21.4 and 3.1 per 100,000 vehicles respectively).  
Based on the literature reviewed, we define traffic safety culture as a general understanding of 
drivers’ behaviour and attitudes within the traffic environment, encompassing the road 
infrastructure, vehicles, road user behaviour and general traffic safety management.  The study 
focussed on the extent to which a road environment with either low or high amounts of 
infrastructure can mediate the effect of a traffic safety culture facilitative of unsafe driving 
behaviour. Although Nigeria has one of the highest road fatality rates in the world, to the knowledge 
of the authors, there are no empirical studies which attempt to examine and observe the driving 
behaviour of Nigerians in detail. It is expected that this present study would fill this gap and provide 
some useful insights needed to develop evidence-based strategies for improving the road safety 
profile in Nigeria and may help to understand the role road safety culture plays as a contributory 
factor to road safety performance in LMICs. Therefore this study aimed to investigate the influence 
of traffic safety culture and infrastructure improvements on driver behaviour. 
2 Method 
2.1 Study design 
A two-way (2x3) mixed design was employed. The between-subject factor was Culture of the 
participants with 3 levels (NG, NG/UK and UK drivers). The NG drivers had gained their licence and 
driving experience in Nigeria only whilst the UK group were licenced and exposed to UK traffic only. 
Finally, the NG/UK group had driven and gained exposure to the traffic culture in both countries. The 
within-subjects factor was Infrastructure with 2 levels (low and high). In the low infrastructure 
condition, traffic signs, road markings and traffic signals were minimal, whilst in the high 
infrastructure condition, these were present and conformed to UK standards. All participants drove 
on roads with low and high infrastructure, counterbalanced to account for order effects. 
2.2 Participants 
Participants were recruited using printed adverts placed at different locations in the University of 
Leeds and the city centre. The eligibility criteria for all participants was stated clearly on the 
recruitment email and adverts. As an additional measure, an email was sent to those who indicated 
interest to take part in the study, where they were asked to confirm where they had experience of 
driving. Subsequently, potential participants completed a set of questions on google form which 
included questions about their driving experience (e.g. “do you have experience of driving in any 
developing or developed country”), where they obtained their driving licenses and had experience of 
driving (UK, Nigeria, Nigeria/UK). Sixteen participants were recruited to each group (NG: 12 males, 4 
females; NG/UK: 12 males, 4 females; UK: 11 males, 5 females) aged 19 to 55 years old. No 
significant age differences were found between the three groups (NG: M=31.75, SD=8.43; NG/UK: 
M=32.56, SD=7.20; UK: M=30.25, SD=5.56). Every participant held either a Nigerian and/or a full 
UK/EU license and had at least 2 years of driving experience (range 2-20 years). As a gesture of 
appreciation, all participants were given £20 for taking part in the study.  
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2.3 Driving scenarios 
A high-fidelity driving simulator (University of Leeds Driving Simulator UoLDS; 
https://uolds.leeds.ac.uk/) was used to create a realistic setting where behaviours relevant to safe 
driving could be examined. UoLDS uses a 2005 Jaguar S-type vehicle model housed in a 4m spherical 
projection dome with a 300° field of view projection system. It has fully operational controls, 
including a steering wheel with force feedback and pedals, as well as rear and side view mirrors. A 
spherical screen projection area displays the road environment at a resolution of 3x1920x1200 to 
the front and 1024x768 in the peripheral and rear views. The side mirrors provide a field of view of 
42°, displayed on CRT screens. While driving, the participant perceives longitudinal and lateral 
movement via a “hexapod” motion base and X-Y table that together provide a realistic perception of 
motion. 
A 20km road was developed consisting of urban and rural segments forming an approximate 26-
minute drive. The road was comprised of one lane in each direction with choreographed traffic in 
the participants’ lane and in the opposite lane. The speed limit varied between 30mph (48km/h), 
40mph (64 km/h) and 60 mph (97 km/h). Seven traffic scenarios were developed, of which four were 
modified by the level of infrastructure. Table 1 provides details of all seven scenarios, as well as 
details regarding how the infrastructure was modified.  
Table 1: Traffic scenarios 
The participant, leader and other road users in the sketch are represented by: 
Participant                Leader/crossing car     other road users 
 
Road layout Scenario description 
 
Amber dilemma  
The participant approached a green traffic light which 
changed to amber 2.5 seconds before they reached the 
junction. They had to decide whether to cross the 
junction or brake to a stop. If they crossed the junction 
when the light was showing red, a violation was 
recorded.   
 
Junction approach and departure 
The participant approached a red traffic light and were 
required to wait for 45 seconds. When the light turned to 
green, they could accelerate through the junction. Mean 
and standard deviation of deceleration rate on the 100m 
approach to the junction, impatient waiting behaviour, 
acceleration rate away from the junction and time to 





Over a distance of 2.5km, participants drove on a 30 
mph (48 km/h) speed limit road, with straights and 
curves and oncoming traffic. Mean speed, speed 
variation and speed limit exceedence were measured. In 
the high infrastructure version of this scenario, speed 
limit signs were positioned repeatedly along the road. 
 
Hazard anticipation  
Participants approached a green traffic light, with other 
stationary vehicles on the minor arms of the junction, 
visible to the participant. Speed and deceleration rates 
were recorded over a distance of 350m. 
 Conflict handling 
This scenario required participants to interact with a 
vehicle whose behaviour posed a potential conflict. As 
the participant approached an unsignalised junction 
where they had priority, at 3 seconds Time To Junction 
(TTJ), a car approached from the left arm and crossed the 
road in front of the participant. Time To Collision (TTC) to 
the emerging car, Brake Reaction Time (BRT) and spot 
speed were measured. In the high infrastructure version 
of this scenario, speed limit signs were positioned prior 





Two potential overtaking scenarios were presented to 
participants on a road with a 60mph speed limit. 
In the first, a low flow of oncoming traffic with a range of 
time headways approximately 25-30 seconds and 
travelling at 40mph, provided a permitted, overtaking 
opportunity. The number of overtaking attempts, time 
headway to the lead and oncoming vehicles, maximum 
speed, distance tailway and indicator use were recorded. 
In the high infrastructure version of this scenario, speed 
limit signs were positioned repeatedly along the road. 
In the second overtaking scenario, the high infrastructure 
version included solid double white lines to indicate that 
overtaking was prohibited. The propensity for 




2.4 Driver Behaviour Questionnaire 
To examine the differences in self-reported driving behaviour between the three driver groups, the 
original 50-item DBQ (Reason et al., 1990) was modified (see Appendix 1) and piloted on a sample of 
Nigerian drivers. Thirty-three original items were retained and 17 were modified to ensure clarity 
and relevance for the Nigerian driving context. For example, the item “Park on a double-yellow line 
and risk a fine” was modified to “Park on a double-yellow line/diagonally striped area and risk a 
fine”, due to the scarcity of double yellow lines on Nigerian roads. This measure was taken because 
the pilot study showed that there was difficulty among Nigerian respondents in interpreting some 
terms in the original version of the DBQ as some descriptions of the road environment involved 
designs which are not obtainable in Nigeria. It provided ideas and the opportunity to modify the 
questionnaire and include terms that are common to Nigerians. The original wordings were retained 
together with the modifications so that it could be used by all groups of drivers. After the 
modifications, a second pilot study was conducted to ascertain that the DBQ could be used 
especially in the Nigerian sample without the difficulties encountered in the first pilot study. As 
standard with the DBQ, respondents were asked to indicate how often they performed each 
behaviour in the last two years using the scale of 0 (= never) to 5 (= nearly all the time).  The aim was 
to identify key items which were rated differently by drivers from the three different traffic cultures.  
2.5 Hypotheses 
It was hypothesised that the effect of Culture would be observed as a main effect whereby NG 
drivers would exhibit (and report via the DBQ [errors, lapses and violations]) more unsafe behaviour 
than the other two groups.  Such unsafe behaviour would include traffic light, speed and overtaking 
violations, later braking on approach to junctions as well as poorer hazard and conflict handling 
skills.  A main effect of Infrastructure was expected, with high infrastructure encouraging safer 
driving.  An Infrastructure x Culture interaction was also hypothesised such that in the low 
infrastructure condition, the NG/UK and UK group would maintain their safer driving behaviour, 
whereas the NG drivers would revert to more unsafe driving behaviour  
2.6 Procedure 
During recruitment, to prevent the participants from preparing for the study, they were told that the 
study was about ‘how different people drive’, without giving details. At the beginning of the session, 
participants were briefed, reminded that the experiment was voluntary, asked to read the 
information sheet, prompted to ask questions and signed the consent form. They were briefed on 
how to operate the simulator and that they were expected to drive as they would normally do. 
Together with the experimenter, participants performed a 10-minute practice drive to become 
familiar with the driving simulator.  The scenarios involving junctions and other vehicles in the 
participant trajectory were not included in the practice drive to prevent learning. Then, they were 
given a short break during which they were monitored for any signs of motion sickness. After this, 
they were asked to start the main experiment. All participants completed two drives (low and high 
infrastructure), each approximately 26-minute duration, separated by a short break and then 
completed the DBQ. Subsequently, a debriefing took place and they had the opportunity to ask 
questions about the study. 
2.7 Data analysis 
The raw simulator data was processed in R to extract the dependent variables, separately for each 
scenario. A mixed methods ANOVA was performed with a between-subjects factor Culture (3 levels: 
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NG; NG/UK; UK) and a within-subjects factor Infrastructure (2 levels: low and high). Where the 
assumption of sphericity was violated, the degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-
Geisser estimates of sphericity. Main and interaction effects are reported, along with post hoc tests 
where appropriate (Bonferroni correction was used). Statistical significance was accepted at p < 
0.05. For the three scenarios where a traffic light was present, analysis was conducted on data from 
the high infrastructure only (as traffic lights were absent in the low infrastructure condition) using a 
one way ANOVA. Where the normality, homogeneity of variances, or outlier assumptions were not 
met, the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was used. Where results were based on counts, Chi-
square was used to determine whether there were any associations between the variables. Post hoc 
tests using residual analysis were conducted on statistically significant variables to test the direction 
of association in each cell and to determine which cell differences contributed to the Chi-square 
result. The size of the standardized residuals was compared to the critical values that correspond to 
an alpha of 0.05 (+/- 1.96).  
The DBQ data were analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS Version 24). 
Before analysis, data were screened for invalid or unusual cases and incorrectly entered data. One-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with pairwise post hoc Bonferroni correction was used to identify 
differences in the tendency to commit aberrant driving behaviours across the three groups of 
drivers. 
3 Results 
3.1 Driving simulator data 
The mean values (SD in brackets) for the dependent variables are presented in tables for each 
scenario.  
3.1.1 Amber dilemma  
This scenario involved participants approaching a green traffic light at a junction which changed to 
amber 2.5 seconds before they reached it. No statistically significant main effects of Culture were 
found with regards the frequency of red light violations.  
3.1.2 Junction approach and departure  
In this scenario, the participant approached a red traffic light, waited for 45 seconds and accelerated 
through the junction when the traffic light turned green. On approach to the junction, a main effect 
of Culture on variation in deceleration was found [F (2, 45) = 6.804, p = .003] with post-hoc testing 
showing that UK drivers decelerated more smoothly than NG drivers by 0.33m/s2 (Table 2). No 
significant differences were found between the other groups for this measure.  
 
Whilst waiting at the red traffic light for 45 seconds, a measure of impatience was implied by 
observing if drivers tended to creep forwards in anticipation of the light turning green. Results 
showed that 63% of NG, 38% of NG/UK and 31% of UK drivers crept forwards and a Kruskal-Wallis 
test demonstrated a significant difference in the mean ranks of the distance covered by the three 
groups [χ2 (2) = 6.693, p = .035]. Dunn’s pairwise tests revealed significant differences between the 
NG and UK and NG and NG/UK groups. The median distance covered was higher for the NG drivers 
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by 2.07m compared to the UK and 1.59m compared to NG/UK drivers. There was no difference 
between the UK and NG/UK groups. 
When the traffic light turned green, a main effect of Culture on acceleration was found, [F (2, 45) 
=8.067, p = .001], with post hoc comparisons revealing that NG drivers accelerated more harshly 
than NG/UK (p = .002) by 0.19m/s2 and UK (p = 0.006) drivers by 0.17m/s2. This resulted in them 
reaching the speed limit quicker [F (2, 45) = 12.335 p = .000]; they reached the speed limit in almost 
half the time of NG/UK (p= .002) and UK drivers (p = .000). 
Table 2: Mean (SD) values for junction approach and departure  
Scenario Variable Culture 
NG NG/UK UK 
Deceleration to red 
light 
Mean deceleration (m/s2) -0.10  (0.06) -0.01 (0.05) -0.09 (0.04) 
SD. deceleration (m/s2) 0.96 (0.26)d 0.75 (0.27) 0.63 (0.22) 
Impatient behaviour *Distance covered (m) 14.11a 6.67  4.17   
Acceleration from 
green light 
Acceleration (m/s2) 0.35 (0.19)a 0.16 (0.15) 0.18 (0.06) 
Time to reach speed limit (secs) 12.41 (10.65)a 22.97 (8.55) 26.13 (3.79) 
a sig. different from the other two cultures; bsig. different from NG; Csig. different from NG/UK; dsig. different from UK 
*mean ranks 
3.1.3 Speed choice (Low and High Infrastructure) 
Over a distance of 2.5km, participants were required to drive on a 30 mph (48.3 km/h) road in both 
high and low infrastructure conditions. In the high infrastructure condition, there were speed signs 
present and none in the low infrastructure condition. Figure 1 shows the speed profiles across all 
experimental conditions.  
 
Figure 1: Speed profile in the speed choice scenario, by Culture and Infrastructure 
 
Several main effects of Culture were found, Table 3. First, there was a significant main effect of 



























low infrastructure NG low infrastructure NG/UK
low infrastructure UK high infrastructure NG
high infrastructure NG/UK high infrastructure UK
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drove at a mean speed 7.44mph higher than NG/UK drivers (p = .000) and 4.31mph higher than UK 
drivers (p = .043). There were no significant differences between NG/UK and UK drivers. Culture was 
also influential on the proportion of time drivers spent exceeding the speed limit [F (2, 90) = 3.781, p 
= .026]: NG drivers exceeded the speed limit more (by 15.43%) compared to the NG/UK drivers (p = 
.032). There were no significant differences between either NG and UK drivers or NG/UK and UK 
drivers. There were no significant main effects of Infrastructure or any interactions between Culture 
and Infrastructure for all the variables measured. 
Table 3: Mean (SD) values for the speed choice scenario 
Variable Infrastructure Culture 
NG NG/UK UK 
Mean speed (mph) Low 44.51 (8.84)a 34.65 (4.76) 35.50 (6.17) 
High 43.62 (10.9)a 32.51 (5.51) 32.78 (3.68) 
SD. Speed (m/s) Low 8.90 (3.72) 7.15 (2.88) 6.02 (3.86) 
High 4.19 (1.43) 3.18 (1.52) 2.49 (0.86) 
Speed limit exceedance 
(% of time) 
Low 91.40 (9.47) c 79.64 (16.63) 84.35 (16.65) 
High 88.56 (28.31)c 60.45 (29.90)  75.92 (20.90) 
a sig. different from the other two cultures; bsig. different from NG; Csig. different from NG/UK; dsig. different from UK 
3.1.4 Hazard anticipation  
This scenario involved participants approaching a green traffic light, with other stationary vehicles 
on the minor arms of the junction. There was a significant main effect of Culture [F (2, 45) = 6.393, p 
= .004] on mean speed, Table 4.  Post-hoc analysis indicated that NG drivers drove at a higher mean 
speed (higher by 8.31mph) compared to the NG/UK drivers (p = 0.004) and (higher by 6.55mph) the 
UK drivers (p = .031). There was no significant difference between NG/UK and UK drivers. There was 
also a main effect of Culture on variation in deceleration [F (2, 45) = 4.619, p = .015]. Post-hoc 
comparisons revealed that NG drivers decelerated more harshly than the UK drivers by 0.22m/s2. 
There were no significant differences between NG and NG/UK or NG/UK and UK. 
Table 4: Mean (SD) values for the hazard anticipation scenario  
Variable 
Culture 
NG NG/UK UK 
Mean speed (mph) 39.88 (10.12)a 31.58 (3.48) 33.34 (5.41) 
Mean deceleration (m/s2) 0.06 (0.80) 0.05 (0.07) 0.04 (0.04) 
SD. deceleration (m/s2) 0.50 (0.35)d 0.31 (0.10) 0.28 (0.11) 
a sig. different from the other two cultures; bsig. different from NG; Csig. different from NG/UK; dsig. different from UK 
3.1.5 Conflict handling (Low and High Infrastructure) 
The conflict handling scenario involved a vehicle emerging from a side road and crossing in front of 
the participant. They were required to avoid the conflict by applying the brakes (even if they were 
travelling below the speed limit).  Several main effects occurred for Culture but none for 
Infrastructure, Table 5. There was a significant main effect of Culture on TTC with the merging 
vehicle [F (2, 45) = 4.723, p = .014], with further analysis showing that the TTC of NG drivers to the 
merging vehicle was significantly lower by 0.77secs compared to that of the NG/UK drivers (p = 
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.013). There were no significant differences between either the UK and NG/UK drivers or NG and UK 
drivers.  
Table 5: Mean (SD) values for the conflict handling scenario 
Variable Infrastructure 
Culture 
NG NG/UK UK 
TTC (secs) 
Low 1.41 (1.17)c 2.23 (1.70) 1.56 (0.708) 
High 1.38 (1.08)c 2.10 (2.04) 1.72 (0.43) 
Spot speed at TTJ = 
3secs (mph) 
Low 52.00 (7.37)a 37.42 (8.92) 40.16 (11.79) 
High 47.25 (11.27)a 41.44 (5.38) 37.71 (4.21) 
BRT (secs) 
Low 3.01 (0.78)a 2.56 (0.22) 2.53 (0.37) 
High 2.93 (0.28)a 2.62 (0.32) 2.58 (0.31) 
a sig. different from the other two cultures; bsig. different from NG; Csig. different from NG/UK; dsig. different from UK 
At a TTJ of 3 secs, a significant main effect of Culture on spot speed [F (2, 18) = 6.598, p = .007] and 
BRT [F (2, 18) = 6.317, p = .008] was found, shown in Figure 2:. Post hoc comparisons showed that 
the spot speed of NG drivers was 10.2mph higher than that of the NG/UK (p = .020) and 10.7mph 
higher than UK drivers (p = .014). Additionally, it took NG drivers a significantly longer time, 0.38secs 
more, to react to the hazard compared with NG/UK (p = .026) and 0.42secs more, compared with 
the UK (p = .015) drivers. There was no significant difference between UK and NG/UK drivers. There 
was no main effect of Infrastructure or interactions between Infrastructure and Culture.  
  
Figure 2: Spot speed and BRT by Culture and Infrastructure 
3.1.6 Permitted overtaking (Low and High Infrastructure) 
The permitted overtaking scenario provided opportunities for participants to overtake the lead 
vehicle when they felt safe to do so. Several main effects of Culture were found, Table 6. The total 
number of attempts at overtaking for the different groups revealed a non-significant trend for a 
























































































The overtaking manoeuvre was studied in more detail by measuring the proximity of the 
participant’s vehicle to both the lead and oncoming vehicle during the overtaking manoeuvre, as 
well as the time spent in the overtaking lane. The way in which participants merged back into the 
lane was also recorded by using a measure of tailway, with a lower value indicating a sharper cutting 
in manoeuvre. There was a significant main effect of Culture on time headway at the start of 
overtaking [F (2, 30) = 4.45, p = .020]. Post hoc comparisons revealed a significant difference 
between the time headway of NG drivers and UK drivers (p = .018), lower for NG drivers by 0.31secs. 
There were no statistically significant differences between the NG and NG/UK or NG/UK and UK 
drivers. There was no main effect of Infrastructure and no interaction between Culture and 
Infrastructure on time headway.  
Maximum speed reached during the overtaking manoeuvre was also measured. There was a 
significant main effect of Culture on maximum speed reached during overtaking [F (2, 31) = 4.733, p 
= .016]. Post hoc comparisons showed that speed was higher for UK, compared to NG drivers by 
5.96mph (p = .013). There were no statistically significant differences between the other groups. 
There were no significant main effects of Infrastructure on maximum speed and no significant 
interaction between Infrastructure and Culture. 
Distance tailway with the lead vehicle provided a measure of how sharply a driver pulled back in 
front of it. There was a significant main effect of Culture on distance tailway [F (2, 30) = 7.380, p 
= .002]. Post hoc comparison showed that there was a significant difference between the tailway of 
UK and NG drivers (p = .002), higher for UK drivers by 10.95mph. There were no significant 
differences between the other groups. There were no main effects of Infrastructure on tailway and 
no interaction between Infrastructure and Culture. 
For time headway with the oncoming vehicle at the end of overtaking and indicator use, no 
significant main effects of Culture and Infrastructure, and no interactions between the conditions 
were found.  
Table 6: Mean (SD) values for the overtaking (permitted) measures  
Variable Infrastructure Culture 
NG NG/UK UK 
*Attempts (count) Low   16 12 14 
High   19 11 14 
*Successful 
overtaking (%) 
Low  93.75 62.50  81.25 
High   87.5 68.75 87.5 
Time Headway to lead 
car (sec) 
Low  0.47 (0.31)d 0.51(0.21) 0.71 (0.23)  
High   0.39 (0.36)d 0.69 (0.38) 0.74 (0.24)  
Max speed (mph) Low  47.94 (5.92)d 52.14 (6.86) 52.58 (5.14) 
High   49.13 (5.20)d 49.94 (6.31) 56.40 (4.60) 
Time Headway to on-
coming vehicle (sec) 
Low  11.25 (3.5) 11.59 (3.1) 8.37 (3.61) 
High   8.68 (2.91) 8.89 (3.81) 7.10 (2.65) 
Distance tailway (m) Low  15.13 (9.94)d 20.14 (6.20) 27.44 (10.62) 
High   13.94 (9.81)d 17.83 (7.36) 23.53 (7.04) 
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*Indicator use (%) Low  68.8 68.8 75.0 
High   81.3 87.5 87.5 
a sig. different from the other two cultures; bsig. different from NG; Csig. different from NG/UK; dsig. different from UK 
*represent total numbers and percentage frequency 
3.1.7 Prohibited overtaking (Low and High Infrastructure) 
In the high infrastructure scenario, an “overtaking prohibited” sign was placed at about 110km 
before the double solid white line marking; this was absent in the low infrastructure condition.  A 
statistically significant association between Culture and the number of violators for the low 
infrastructure (χ2 = 7.807, p = .020) and high infrastructure (χ2 = 13.844, p = .001) conditions was 
found, Table 7. Post hoc testing showed that among drivers who violated the no overtaking rule, 
there were more NG drivers than would be expected for both the low infrastructure and high 
infrastructure conditions. 




NG NG/UK UK 
Violation (count) Low 8 a 4 1 
High 11 a 5 1 
a sig. different from the other two cultures; bsig. different from NG; Csig. different from NG/UK; dsig. different from UK 
3.2 Driver Behaviour Questionnaire 
Appendix 2 shows the mean scores (SD) for each of the individual items relating to violations, errors 
and slips/lapses in the DBQ for the three groups of drivers.  
There were significant differences between the three cultures for 15 of the 50 items (nine violations 
and six slips/lapses), see Table 8. For the violations (five ordinary and four aggressive), NG drivers 
reporting a higher frequency than NG/UK and UK drivers for 8/9 of them. With regards slips/lapses, 
NG/UK drivers reported slips/lapses more frequently than did the other two cultures, for 4/6 of 
them. No differences in errors were found.  The NG drivers reported a significantly higher annual 
crash involvement compared to NG/UK and UK drivers. 
Table 8: Mean (SD) significant DBQ measures and self-reported yearly crash involvement  
Variables NG NG/UK UK F (2,45) Eta2 
Yearly crash involvement 1.50 (1.37) a .50 (1.27) .56 (.73) .38 .14 
Violations      
V2 Drive without papers (OV) 1.38 (1.31) d 1 (1.15) .13 (.34) 6.24 .22 
V4 Impatient, overtake on the inside (AV) 2.31 (1.44) c 1.31 (.79) 1.44 (1.26) 3.30 .13 
V5 Drive close to or 'flash' the car in front 
(AV) 
2.38 (1.41) 1.63 (1.45) .44 (1.03) a 8.87 .28 
V6 Risky overtaking (AV) 1.56 (1.36) d 1.38 (1.14) .56 (.63) 3.80 .14 
V8 Angry, give chase (AV) .13 (1.29) a 1.06 (1.39) 1.06 (1.38) 6.07 .21 
V14 Cut corner on a left/right-hand turn 
(OV) 
.94 (1.12)d .88 (.72) .25 (.44) 3.51 .13 
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V16 Ignore give-way signs (OV) 1.00 (1.32) d .75 (.78) .06 (.25) 4.72 .17 
V17 Drive wrong way down one-way 
street (OV) 
1.00 (.82) a .38 (.62) .19 (.54) 6.46 .22 
V19 Get involved in unofficial races (OV) .81 (.98) d .63 (.81) .06 (.25) 4.37 .16 
Slips/lapses      
S2 Locked out of car with keys inside  .75 (1.18) d .69 (.95) .12 (.71) 3.62 .14 
S11 overtake without  checking mirror  .94 (1.06) 1 (.89) .13 (.34) a 5.59 .20 
S13 Turning right/left, nearly hit 
cyclist/tricycle  
1.00 (1.09) 1.13 (1.03) .19 (.40) a 5.16 .19 
S15 Misjudge speed of oncoming vehicle  1.31 (1.01) d 1.19 (.91) .56 (.51) 3.65 .14 
S16 Fail to see pedestrian stepping out  .56 (.81) .94 (.85) d .25 (.45) 3.57 .14 
S19 Try to overtake vehicle turning 
left/right  
1 (.967) 1.25 (1.13) d .44 (.63) 3.20 .13 
a sig. different from the other two cultures; bsig. different from NG; Csig. different from NG/UK; dsig. different from UK 
4 Discussion 
This study sought to discover if three groups of drivers, trained and experienced in different traffic 
safety cultures, displayed and reported different road safety behaviour. In addition, the efficacy of 
implementing infrastructure measures known to improve road safety in HICs was evaluated across 
all three groups of drivers. It was hypothesised that traffic safety culture would mediate the positive 
effects of infrastructure. 
In six of the seven driving simulator scenarios, the NG/UK and UK drivers tended to show safer 
patterns of behaviour compared to the NG drivers. The NG drivers travelled at higher speeds and 
spent more time exceeding the speed limit, on links and at junctions. This desire to make progress, 
was also captured in their propensity to overshoot junction markings whilst awaiting a green light 
and subsequent faster acceleration. Such impatience has also been termed as aggressive driving 
Laagland (2005) and Tasca (2000). It is well known that high and inappropriate speed is one of many 
factors contributing to the number and severity of road traffic crashes in Nigeria (FRSC, 2018). The 
speed of traffic on many Nigerian roads is much higher than the speed limit (Uzondu et al., 2018) 
and according to FRSC (2018), 44% of road traffic crashes in Nigeria in 2017 were caused by 
speeding.  It would be reasonable to believe that international differences in the number of road 
traffic crashes would partly be affected by driver’s speed choice. According to Warner et al. (2009), 
drivers who live in a country with fewer road traffic fatalities (i.e. Sweden), report a more positive 
attitude towards complying with the speed limit, a higher intention and a larger proportion of the 
time spent complying compared with drivers who live in a country with more road traffic fatalities 
(i.e. Turkey). 
As the NG drivers were travelling faster on approach to junctions, compared to the other two 
groups, they were subsequently required to brake more sharply as they reached it. Coupled with 
longer reaction times, the NG drivers had shorter TTCs to the emerging vehicle in the conflict 
scenario, thus compromising safety (Minderhoud & Bovy, 2001). Even though the TTC of the UK 
drivers was also short, travelling at a lower speed enabled them to react faster to the hazard 
compared to the NG drivers. The faster reaction times displayed by the NG/UK and UK drivers could 
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be as a result of hazard perception training, as all NG/UK and UK participants would have practised 
for and passed the traditional hazard perception test in order to obtain their license (Lim et al., 
2014). This finding is consistent with Bates et al. (2013) and McDonald et al. (2015) who showed that 
drivers who participated in hazard perception training could identify more hazards, scan their driving 
environment more effectively, anticipate hazards more quickly and slow down more when 
approaching hazards, than those who did not participate in such training.  
As well as these differences in control level skills (Michon, 1985), NG drivers exhibited different 
higher-order decision making skills, compared to the other groups. They engaged in more overtaking 
and in doing so accepted smaller safety margins to the vehicle they overtook. Research has shown 
that increases in the number of overtaking manoeuvres correlates with increases in crash probability 
(Hauer, 1971). Drivers seeking to overtake can be more at risk of a rear-end crash due to the 
tendency of drivers to maintain shorter headways prior to overtaking (Hegeman, 2008; Ghods et al., 
2012), a tendency of the NG drivers observed in this study. In contrast, the maximum speed reached 
during the overtaking manoeuvre was higher for UK drivers in the two overtaking scenarios 
compared to the NG/UK and NG drivers. This is efficient on the one hand because time spent 
completing overtaking will be reduced (Chandra & Shukla, 2012) but may compromise safety. NG 
drivers showed greater propensity to violate the no-overtaking rule. This could be due to lack of 
knowledge of what the markings represent.  
Moving onto the effect of adding infrastructure, there was no change in behaviour in any of the four 
scenarios where this was implemented.  For example, in both overtaking scenarios, the behaviour of 
the three groups of drivers was similar irrespective of the infrastructure conditions. This is likely due 
to the fact that there was a floor effect in the propensity to overtake in the UK and NG/UK driver 
groups such that being exposed to more infrastructure could not improve their behaviour further. 
Similarly, in the speed choice scenario, NG/UK and UK drivers travelled at appropriate speed even in 
the low infrastructure condition, whereas NG drivers travelled at high speeds in both. In the conflict 
handling scenario, the three groups of driver exhibited similar behaviour in both infrastructure 
conditions.   
Moving onto the self-report measures of the DBQ, consistent with past studies (Özkan et al., 2006; 
Warner et al., 2011; Bener et al., 2013), there were no statistically significant differences in the 
frequency of reported errors between the three driver groups. However, NG drivers reported a 
higher number of violations compared to the other two groups, and that, rather unexpectedly, the 
NG/UK drivers reported a higher number of slips/lapses compared to NG and UK drivers. Rule 
violation is one of the important predictors of road traffic crashes and conflicts in Nigeria (FRSC, 
2018; Uzondu et al., 2019). Although aggressive and ordinary violations were grouped together in 
this study, the results showed that they were more common in the NG group. Aggressive behaviours 
involve being hostile especially towards other road users and aggressive drivers act on their anger by 
showing this hostility. This finding may partly explain why Nigeria has poorer traffic safety records 
than the UK (WHO, 2018).   
The results are in line with Özkan et al. (2006) who revealed that drivers from safe countries 
exhibited safer behaviours especially in the scenarios where speed, acceleration, hazard reaction, 
overtaking, traffic light compliance were measured compared to drivers from ‘‘dangerous’’ 
countries. In addition, research has also shown that drivers from countries with high crash rates are 
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less motivated than those with low crash rate to comply with traffic laws and are more likely to drive 
aggressively (Shinar & Compton, 2004).  
In summary, the results provide preliminary evidence that poor traffic safety culture could be 
resistant to change, despite improvements in infrastructure. It supports Novaco (2001) and WHO 
(2009), that improvements in the road environment alone may not bring about significant changes in 
drivers’ behaviour especially for the NG drivers who have a history of unsafe driving behaviour which 
has been further confirmed from the results of this study. Additionally, in six out of seven scenarios, 
the behaviour of the NG/UK group was similar to that of the UK group which could be due to 
exposure to the new traffic safety culture (which includes other drivers), rather than only repeated 
exposure to the higher level of infrastructure. According to Delicado (2012), if drivers do not drive 
safely, it is not a simple lack of knowledge and skills or their unwillingness. The problem appears to 
be connected to routine behaviour (safety culture), which is inherently very difficult to change.  
Musselwhite et al. (2010) argue that regardless of whether a person intends to drive safely or not, 
habitual processes (developed out of frequent experience with the environment) tend to supersede 
cognitive processing. Driving tasks such as braking and accelerating tend to be automated and can 
be carried out without conscious attention (Boer & Hoedemaeker, 1998); thus bringing safety into 
the consciousness of NG drivers would require more than just improvements in the road 
environment alone. It is not enough to only focus on infrastructural developments when developing 
measures to improve traffic safety in LMICs. One way of influencing road safety outcomes could be 
by changing a society’s attitude and behaviour towards risk taking (i.e. its safety culture). This could 
be achieved by taking into consideration any unique characteristics of the society such as socio-
economic status, demography, culture, traffic environment, and the law of the countries (Bener et 
al., 2003; Özkan et al., 2006). Another way of dealing with the problems of unsafe driving could be 
through driver education and training which may address the unawareness of basic rules and 
regulations. This is very important, because unsafe behaviours were recorded even though 
improvements in infrastructure was made. Therefore, drivers need to be made aware of what 
driving behaviour is expected of them. This can incorporate strategies that target specific behaviours 
and highlight the consequences of unsafe behaviour, for example, driving at the appropriate speed, 
increasing safety margins, compelling drivers to their indicator etc. The goal is to enable drivers to 
make correct decisions and be safe in traffic. This must be conducted by competent instructors and 
examiners who possess the right knowledge and skills. 
 
One limitation of the present study is the sample size; thus it is important to note that the sample 
group used in this study does not necessarily represent the drivers in each society, especially 
regarding the use of the DBQ (as this version was adapted for the first time for NG drivers). 
Therefore, a direction for future research would be the replication of these same items including 
some items from the Nigerian Highway Code in a larger sample of NG drivers. This would help to 
establish the reliability and generalizability of the results. However, even if the present sample is not 
a perfect representation of the Nigerian population, the reported DBQ scores serves as a strong 
foundation for establishing a Nigerian version of the instrument. Another important aspect for 
furthering the current study would be the recruitment of more homogeneous sample groups 
(including gender) for all cultures and to examine the possible approaches for improving the 
behaviour of Nigerian drivers. In addition, to investigate if the number of years the individual drivers 
in the NG/UK group has spent driving in the UK has an effect on adapting to the UK road 
environment. This could not be done in this research because the comparisons carried out were 
between groups of drivers and not individual drivers. It would also be important to consider and 
investigate other variables (such as age, driving experience, gender) that may influence the safe and 
unsafe driving behaviours observed in this study. The extent to which the results of this study can be 
generalised is very important because it was a self-reported and driving simulator study, and it is 
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possible for results to diverge from what would be obtained in the real world. Therefore, it is 
suggested that the results could provide a basis for future studies in this area. 
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study has provided a contribution to the understanding of 
cross-cultural differences in driving behaviour and from these results, four policy recommendations 
are suggested: 
First, this research acknowledges that a society’s traffic safety culture influences driving behaviour, 
and therefore, implies that behaviour-changing interventions developed on a good understanding of 
drivers’ cultural environment could be successful.  
Second, the findings suggest that more country-specific research should be undertaken. The 
differences observed between the driving behaviour of Nigerian and UK drivers, could mean that 
road safety solutions, which are usually adopted by Nigeria from HICs, may not be effective unless 
they are adapted to take into account local behaviours.  
Third, the results of this study can be used to improve safety education programs by increasing 
drivers’ awareness of the behaviours that can increase crash risk. 
Fourth, the study empirically provides the basis to develop countermeasures specific to the most 
frequently committed unsafe behaviours on Nigerian roads.  
The differences between groups of drivers require the development of cultural‐differentiated 
policies relevant to each culture. Strict laws and severe sanctions, along with the teachings of 
cultural values, particularly concerning safety, should be implemented to address unsafe behaviour. 
Therefore, this study can be used to inform future research directions to promote cultural change. 
The promotion of safety culture especially in LMICs is pertinent considering the findings of this study 
and the need to develop tailored approaches to culture change. Having an appropriate strategy and 
action plan is different from implementation. As there are several excellent road safety management 
systems around the world, these cannot be implemented effectively without a political and 
communal willingness to develop a safe traffic system. Change in road safety culture would require 
political will and a strong commitment from all levels of government. A paradigm shift based on a 
change in road user’s thinking is needed; behaviour modification and the establishment of the 
principle of socially and religiously unacceptable violations of traffic laws could be a good starting 
point. It is hoped that a consistent and collective effort from individuals, communities and the 
government can help to achieve sustainable road safety practices in Nigeria. Considering the 
“limited” resources available for road safety interventions in Nigeria, and most LMICs, it will be 
appropriate to focus more on evidence-based solutions, which have proved to be effective and easy 
to implement. 
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Appendix 1: Driver Behaviour Questionnaire (DBQ) 
 
Participant id: _________ 
 
Dear Participant, 
Thank you for volunteering to participate in this survey, which is a part of the driving simulator 
experiment and being undertaken as part of PhD research in the Institute for Transport Studies, 
University of Leeds, UK. The purpose of the survey is to investigate drivers’ behaviours. The 
questionnaire is simple and you are not required to give precise answers. If after giving a response, 
you change your mind, please cross it neatly and circle another one. Your responses will be 
anonymous and treated in strictest confidence. Your participation is completely voluntary, but 
should you feel concerned you have the right to stop participating at any time.  
 
PART A: QUESTIONS ABOUT YOU  
This section is designed to help us know about your general characteristics. 
 
1. Gender: male   ___   female ___   
2. Age: prefer not to answer  ___   under 19 ___  19-34 ___   35-55  ___ 55+ ___ 
3. How many road crashes you have been involved in the last three years?  
crashes_______ 
4. How long have you been driving? Less than 2 years ___ 3-6 years ___ 6-15 years ___ more than 
15 years ___.   
5. Where do you have experience of driving? Nigeria_______ UK_______ both _______ 
 
PART B: QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR DRIVING BEHAVIOUR  
For each question, you are required to indicate the frequency with which you have performed each 
type of behaviour by circling the appropriate number. 











1. Attempt to drive away from traffic lights in 
wrong gear? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Check your speedometer and discover that 
you are unknowingly travelling faster than the 
speed limit? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Lock yourself out of your car with the keys still 
inside? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Become impatient with a slow driver in the 
outer lane and overtake on the inside? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Drive as fast along country/village roads at 
night on low beam as you would on high beam? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Attempt to drive away without first having 
switched on the ignition? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
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7. Drive especially close to or 'flash' the car in 
front of you as a signal for that driver to go faster 
or get out of your way? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Forget where you left or parked your car? 0 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Distracted or preoccupied, failed to realise on 
time that the vehicle ahead has slowed and have 
to slam on the brakes to avoid a collision? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Intend to switch on the windscreen wipers, 
but switch on the lights instead, or vice versa? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
11. Turn left/right on to a main road into the 
path of an oncoming vehicle that you hadn't 
seen, or whose speed you had misjudged? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Misjudge the available space where you 
parked your car and nearly (or actually) hit 
another vehicle? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Realize you have no clear recollection of the 
road along which you have just been traveling? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Miss your exit on a motorway/highway and 
have to make a lengthy detour? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Forget which gear you are currently in and 
have to check with your hand? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
16. Stuck behind a slow-moving vehicle on a two-
lane highway, you are driven by frustration and 
try to overtake in risky circumstances? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
17. Intending to drive to destination A, you 
suddenly realize that you are en route to B, 
because that is your more usual destination? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
18. Take a chance and run the red light? 0 1 2 3 4 5 
19. Angered by another driver's behaviour, you 
give chase with the intention of giving him/her a 
piece of your mind? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
20. Try to overtake without first checking your 
mirror, and then get hooted/horned at by the 
car behind which has already begun its 
overtaking manoeuvre? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
21. Deliberately disregard the speed limits at 
any time (morning, afternoon, evening, night)? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
22. Forget when your road 
tax/insurance/vehicle papers expires and 
discover that you are driving illegally? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
23. Forget that your lights are on full beam until 
'flashed' by other motorists? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
24. On turning left/right, nearly hit a 
cyclist/tricycle who has come up beside you? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
25. In a queue of vehicles turning left/right on to 
a main road, pay such close attention to the 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
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traffic approaching from the right/left that you 
nearly hit the car in front? 
26. Drive even though you realize that you may 
be over the legal blood-alcohol limit? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
27. Have an aversion to a particular class of road 
user, and indicate your hostility by whatever 
means you can? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
28. Lost in thought or distracted, you fail to 
notice someone waiting at a zebra crossing, or a 
pelican crossing light that has just turned red? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
29. Park on a double-yellow line/diagonally 
striped area and risk a fine? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
30. Underestimate/Misjudge speed of an 
oncoming vehicle when overtaking? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
31. Hit something when reversing that you had 
not previously seen? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
32. Fail to notice someone stepping out from 
behind a bus or parked vehicle until it is nearly 
too late? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
33. Plan your route badly, so that you meet 
traffic congestion you could have avoided? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
34. Overtake a single line of stationary or slow-
moving vehicles, only to discover that they were 
queueing to get through a one lane gap or 
roadwork lights? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
35. Overtake a slow-moving vehicle on the inside 
lane or hard shoulder of a motorway? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
36. Cut the corner on a left/right-hand turn and 
have to swerve violently to avoid an oncoming 
vehicle? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
37. Get into the wrong lane when approaching an 
intersection or roundabout? 
0 1 2 3 
 
4 5 
38. Fail to read the signs correctly, and exit from 
a roundabout on the wrong road? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
39. Fail to give way when a bus is signalling its 
intention to pull out? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
40. Ignore 'give way' signs, and narrowly avoid 
colliding with traffic having right of way? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
41. Fail to check your mirrors before pulling out, 
changing lanes, turning etc.? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
42. Attempt to overtake a vehicle that you 
hadn't noticed was signalling its intention to 
turn right/left? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
43. Deliberately drive the wrong way down a 
deserted one-way street? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
44. Disregard red lights when driving late at night 
along empty roads? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
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45. Drive with only 'half-an-eye' on the road 
while looking at a map, changing a CD player or 
radio channel etc.? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
46. Fail to notice pedestrians crossing when 
turning into a side street from a main road? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
47. Get involved in unofficial 'races' with other 
drivers? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
48. 'Race' oncoming vehicles for a one-car gap 
on a bad, narrow or obstructed road? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
49. Brake too hard or quickly on a slippery road 
and/or steer the wrong way in a skid? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
50. Misjudge your crossing interval when 
turning right/left and narrowly miss colliding? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
In bold: modified items 
 
Appendix 2: Differences in different cultures' self-reported yearly crash involvement and tendency 
to commit different unsafe driving behaviours 
Variables NG  NG/UK UK F(2,45) Eta2 
Yearly crash involvement 1.50(1.37) c .50(1.27) .56 (.73) .38* .14 
Violations      
V1 Unknowingly speeding (OV) 2.88(.95) 2.75(1.52) 2.31(1.14) .92 .04 
V2 Drive without papers (OV) 1.38(1.31) d 1(1.15) .13(.34) 6.24* .22 
V3 Fail to see pedestrian waiting (OV) .88(1.03) .94(.68) .56(.73) .95 .04 
V4 Impatient, overtake on the inside (AV) 2.31(1.44) c 1.31(.79) 1.44(1.26) 3.30* .13 
V5 Drive close to or 'flash' the car in front 
(AV) 
2.38 (1.41) 1.63(1.45) .44(1.03) a 8.87* .28 
V6 Risky overtaking (AV) 1.56(1.36) d 1.38(1.14) .56(.63) 3.80* .14 
V7 Take a chance and run the red light (OV) .63(.72) .81(1.17) .19(.40) 2.42 .09 
V8 Angry, give chase (AV) .13(1.29) a 1.06(1.39) 1.06(1.38) 6.07* .21 
V9 Disregard speed at night (OV) 1.25(1.34) 1.38(1.14) 1.56(1.42) .23 .01 
V10 Drink and drive (OV) .19(.544) .13(.34) .25(.57) .25 .01 
V11 Have an aversion (AV) .50(.73) .75(.77) .25(.77) 1.73) .07 
V12 Illegal parking (OV) .44(.62) .88(.88) .56(.89) 1.23 .05 
V13 Overtake on right/left on motorway (OV) .94(1.12) .94(.85) .94(1.12) .00 .00 
V14 Cut corner on a left/right-hand turn 
(OV) 
.94(1.12)d .88(.72) .25(.44) 3.51* .13 
V15 Fail to give way to bus (OV) .81(1.17) 1.25(1.34) 1.19(.83) .70 .03 
V16 Ignore give-way signs (OV) 1.00(1.32) d .75(.78) .06(.25) 4.72* .17 
V17 Drive wrong way down one-way street 
(OV) 
1.00(.82) a .38(.62) .19(.54) 6.46* .22 
V18 Disregard red lights when driving (OV) .81(.98) .81(1.38) .25(.58) 1.59 .07 
V19 Get involved in unofficial races (OV) .81(.98) d .63(.81) .06(.25) 4.37* .16 
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V20 Race vehicles for a one-car gap (AV) .63(.96) .69(.79) .13(.34) 2.74 .11 
Errors      
E1 Drive as fast on low beam as on high beam  1.50(1.2) .88(.72) 1.13(1.09) 1.50 .06 
E2 Turn left/right on to vehicle’s path  1.44(1.03) .88(.89) .88(.72) 2.14 .09 
E3 Misjudge available space/gap in car park  .75(.86) 1.25(1.12) 1(.82) 1.13 .05 
E4 Hit something when reversing  .94(.85) .88(.72) .38(.50) 3.05 .12 
E5 Plan route badly  1.44(.96) 1.69(1.07) 1.25(1.24) .64 .03 
E6 Overtake queue  1.51(1.03) 1.44(1.03) .75(.86) 2.90 .11 
E7 Get into wrong lane at roundabout  1.25(1.18) 1.13(1.09) 1.69(.87) 1.25 .05 
E8 Brake to quickly  .63(1.15) .75(.78) .38(.62) .76 .03 
E9 Misjudge crossing interval when turning 
right/left  
.56(.73) .88(.81) .25(.58) 3.10 .12 
Slips/lapses      
S1 Attempt to drive away in wrong gear 1.13 (1.03) 1.12 (1.24) .88(.62) .59 .03 
S2 Locked out of car with keys inside  .75 (1.18) d .69(.95) .12(.71) 3.62* .14 
S3 Attempt to drive off without switching on 
the ignition  
.44(.81) .31(.48) .38(.70) .12 .01 
S4 Forget where car is  1.19(1.33) .81(.91) .75(.68) .88 .04 
S5 Distracted, have to brake hard  1.38(.81) 1.13(.89) 1.13(.50) .59 .03 
S6 Intend to switch on wipers, but switch on 
lights  
1.56(1.15) 1.44(1.09) .69(.95) 3.14 .12 
S7 No recollection of recent road  1.19(1.17) 1.44(1.37) 1.31(.80) .20 .01 
S8 Miss exit on a motorway/highway  1.81(1.38) 2.06(.99) 1.69(.87) .48 .02 
S9 Forget which gear  1.00(1.10) 1.31(1.10) 1.50(.82) 1.01 .04 
S10 On usual route by mistake  1.19(1.10) 1.75(1.07) 1.63(1.09) 1.18 .05 
S11 overtake without  checking mirror  .94(1.06) 1(.89) .13(.34) a 5.59* .20 
S12 Forget light on main beam  1.38(1.20) 1.44(1.31) 1.06(.68)  .53 .02 
S13 Turning right/left, nearly hit 
cyclist/tricycle  
1.00(1.09) 1.13(1.03) .19(.40) a 5.16* .19 
S14 Queuing, nearly hit car in front  1.19(1.17) 1.25(.86) .69(.79) 1.67 .07 
S15 Misjudge speed of oncoming vehicle  1.31(1.01) d 1.19(.91) .56(.51) 3.65* .14 
S16 Fail to see pedestrian stepping out  .56(.81) .94(.85) d .25(.45) 3.57* .14 
S17 exit roundabout on the wrong lane  1.19(1.28) 1.44(1.09) 1.38(.96) .22 .01 
S18 Manoeuvre without checking mirror  1.06(1.06) 1(.73) 1(.73) .03 .00 
S19 Try to overtake vehicle turning left/right  1(.967) 1.25(1.13)d .44(.63)9 3.20* .13 
S20 Only half-an-eye on the road  1.44(1.41) 1.50(1.59) 1.94(1.39) .55 .02 
S21 Fail to see pedestrians crossing  .56(.73) .88(.89) .81(.66) .75 .03 
Results are based on one way ANOVA, with Bonferroni correction. All the numbers are presented as Mean (SD); (In bold) * statistically 
significantly different at 0.05%. a statistically significantly different from other two cultures (p<0.05); b statistically significantly different 
from NG (p<0.05); C statistically significantly different from NG/UK (p<0.05) d statistically significantly different from UK (p<0.05). 
V=Violations (OV-ordinary violation; AV-aggressive violation); E=Errors and S= Slips/lapses 
 
